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Article 
Cuban Migration to the United States in a Post-
Normalized Relations World 
Kevin J. Fandl 
Abstract 
Relations between Cuba and the United States have ebbed 
and flowed between outright hostility and friendship. Recently, 
major steps have been taken by both countries to put the Cold War 
past behind them and work toward a sustainable relationship for 
the future. As economic and political relations between the two 
neighbors improve, it is imperative that immigration policy be 
part of the transitional process. Cubans have enjoyed special 
immigration status for half a century, largely as a result of the 
Cold War. The process of economic normalization must include a 
normalization of immigration policy, phasing out the 
unnecessary and unfair favoritism that is a vestige of a long-gone 
era of our history. 
  
 
  Kevin J. Fandl, Ph.D. (George Mason University), J.D./M.A. (American 
University), B.A. (Lock Haven University), is an Assistant Professor of Legal 
Studies and Strategic Global Management at Temple University. He is also the 
former Chief of Staff for International Trade and Intellectual Property at the 
United States Department of Homeland Security’s International Intellectual 
Property Rights Enforcement Center. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although one cannot predict with certainty the reaction 
of the United States government to the start of Cuba’s 
democratic transition, its immigration policy towards 
Cuba is unlikely to remain the same once the process gets 
under way. For over three decades, the United States has 
accepted hundreds of thousands of Cubans, bypassing 
the standard rules for granting asylum or admitting 
aliens as permanent residents. This preferential 
treatment given to Cuban immigrants will almost 
certainly cease with the end of communism in Cuba, 
unless the political conditions on the island remain 
unstable and warrant continuation of some program for 
the handling of refugees . . . .Since the immigration 
policy of this country is to provide uniform treatment to 
aliens seeking admission, regardless of their country of 
origin, Cuban nationals may well find themselves facing 
the same barriers that citizens from other countries 
presently experience in seeking to migrate to the United 
States.1 
These words were spoken by a Cuban attorney at a meeting 
on the Cuban economy in 1998.2 The statement came three years 
after Cuba had enacted a major foreign investment law 
welcoming investments, even from Americans, to stimulate their 
economy.3 It was also made two years after the Helms-Burton 
Act passed the United States Congress, putting significant 
economic and political pressure on Cuba through economic 
sanctions tied to a democratic transition on the island.4 No 
doubt, the tone at the end of the decade was one of hope through 
action. And now, 18 years later we see that the hope was 
squandered. But is there new hope today in the face of a 
softening tone toward Cuba? 
 
 
 1. Matias F. Travieso-Díaz, Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in 
a Post-Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 234, 251 (1998). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Kevin J. Fandl, Foreign Investment in Cuban Real Property: The 
Case for American Investors, 45 REAL ESTATE L. J. 166, 180 (2016). 
 4. Andreas Lowenfield & Brice Clagett, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-
Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 419 (1996). 
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The United States has a long history with its neighbor 90 
miles south of Florida. And given its proximity, Cuba has been a 
part of United States foreign policy, national security, and 
migration since its independence from Spain in 1898.5 At that 
moment, the United States was directly involved in the 
establishment of a free Cuba under the auspices of the United 
States government, similar to Puerto Rico but without 
citizenship rights. Trade relations between the countries were 
strong through the first half of the twentieth century, with Cuba 
exporting sugar and other agricultural products and the United 
States exporting essential commodities.6 
The relationship between the United States and Cuba 
dramatically changed following the coup d’état by Fidel Castro 
and the removal of Fulgencio Bautista from office. Castro 
installed himself as a dictator and quickly aligned himself with 
the communist movement led by the Soviet Union.7 What 
unfolded after this turn of events was the rapid deterioration of 
relations between the once friendly neighbors into proxy wars, 
subversive interventions, and ultimately a nonviolent standoff.8 
Today, as a new generation with little connection to the cold war 
expresses their desire to bring Cuba back into the neighborhood 
on positive terms, there is hope that the two countries will once 
again engage with each other.9 
The effects that the recent softening of United States-Cuba 
relations will have on Cuban and American markets, which I 
 
 5. See generally Marc-William Palen, The Unequal US-Cuban Power 
Relationship Stretches Back to the Turn of the 20th Century, HISTORYTODAY 
(Dec. 21, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.historytoday.com/marc-william-palen/us-
cuba-embargo-goes-beyond-cold-war (describing United States-Cuba relations 
throughout history, with particular emphasis on the rise of American 
imperialism and economic nationalism vis-à-vis Cuba and other occupied 
colonies following the Spanish-American War in 1898). 
 6. See generally Louis A. Perez Jr., As Cuba and the United States 
Reengage: The Presence of the Past, ORIGINS: CURRENT EVENTS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, June 2015, at paras. 22, 29–47, https://origins.osu.edu/article
/cuba-and-united-states-reengage-presence-past (describing both the 
importance of Sugar to the Cuban economy in the late 19th Century and the 
creation of a “free” Cuba). 
 7. See generally Alan H. Luxenberg, Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the 
Arms of the Soviets?, 30 J. INT’L STUD. & WORLD AFF. 37, 42–45 (1988) 
(discussing Castro’s rise to power and his allegiance to Communism). 
 8. See William Harvey Reeves, The Cuban Situation, 17 BUS. LAW. 980, 
981, 986–88 (1962). 
 9. Spencer Parts, ‘Optimistic’ Cuban Youths Prepare to Welcome Obama, 
MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 18, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news
/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article66980802.html. 
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have discussed elsewhere,10 is uncertain but likely positive. And 
the likelihood of more significant change in the near future is 
also strong.11 What is less certain, however, is what will happen 
to U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba. Cubans that fled the 
island after Castro seized power were welcomed to the United 
States as political refugees. They were afforded a special 
immigration status that provided them with privileges that 
other migrants did not (and do not) have. This special Cuban 
migrant policy has been in place both as a way to provide refuge 
from Cuban communism and also as a way to appease the 
significant Cuban-American population in the United States, a 
rare group of first generation immigrants with voting rights.12 
In the face of normalizing economic and political relations 
between the countries, the status of that special migration policy 
is likely to come under fire. 
In this paper, I will attempt to explain the dilemma that 
policymakers will face when the following question arises: now 
that relations with Cuba have been normalized, should Cuban 
migrants be subjected to the same scrutiny as other migrants? 
To do so, I will provide some background on the Cuban migration 
story by discussing key events in Cuban history that drove 
Cubans to leave the island in search of refuge in the United 
States. Then, I will explain the corresponding United States 
immigration laws affecting those Cuban migrants and how they 
have changed over time. Finally, I will describe the impact that 
normalized relations might have on Cuban migration by looking 
at similar cases in other socialist countries. 
  
 
 10. See Fandl, supra note 3. 
 11. Kevin J. Fandl, Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of 
the United States Embargo on Cuba, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 43 (forthcoming 2017). 
 12. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 250–52 (noting that Cubans have 
enjoyed special immigration rights in the past due to their flee from communism 
and, in the future, legislators will have to take political ramifications into 
account when proposing new immigration policy). 
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II. THE CUBAN MIGRATION STORY 
Following World War II, at a time when thousands of 
individuals were displaced from their home countries due to war 
and the rise of communism, the United States enacted the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948.13 That Act served as a precursor 
to the refugee policy later adopted, but interestingly, it also 
highlighted the preference of the United States government to 
welcome people displaced by communism; it attempted to deal 
with the refugee crisis produced by the war in Europe, but 
“singled out those fleeing from communist or communist-
dominated countries as the most deserving for refugee status.”14 
That Act exemplified the United States interest in providing a 
home for those whose political ideals conflicted with the ideals 
of communist regimes. This approach led the United States to 
welcome and even to encourage political refugees from Soviet 
republics, China, Cuba, and elsewhere, throughout the Cold 
War.15 To better understand how the route from communism in 
Cuba to capitalism in the United States developed for Cuban 
migrants, we must start with the revolution. 
Since its independence from Spain in 1898 and from the 
United States in 1902, Cuba was led by a series of largely United 
States-supported authoritarian leaders.16 Fidel Castro, who 
disagreed with the corrupt and brutal leadership of Fulgencio 
Batista, led a successful coup against the Cuban government in 
1958.17 This alone did not break the relationship between the 
United States and Cuba. It was a mixture of President 
Eisenhower’s distaste for Castro and Cuba’s distaste for 
American interference in their politics since 1898 that largely 
led to the steps both governments took in subsequent years to 
consolidate their positions. Without American support, Cuba 
turned to the Soviets, who visited shortly after the revolution, 
according to CIA documents.18 
 
 13. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1010 (1948). 
 14. Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The 
Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 253, 258 (1995). 
 15. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 239, 245 n.55. 
 16. See Fandl, supra note 3, at 166–67. 
 17. See, e.g., Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General 
Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-
Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 901, 908 
(1995). 
 18. Memorandum from Sherman Kent, Chairman, Office of Nat’l 
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As part of its efforts to dispel support for the Castro regime, 
the United States took steps to encourage Cuban defections, 
especially of the elite and educated classes that might improve 
the Cuban economy.19 
A. FREEDOM FLIGHTS: THE CUBAN AIRLIFT IN NOVEMBER 
1965 – APRIL 1973 
On September 29, 1965, Fidel Castro declared that any 
Cuban wanting to leave the island nation was free to do so.20 He 
opened the Port of Camarioca and allowed Cubans wishing to 
depart to do so after filing a form with the state relinquishing 
title to all property in Cuba. Nearly 3,000 Cubans fled by boat 
into the rough seas on their way to the United States. The 
United States Coast Guard initiated a boatlift to rescue some of 
those migrants and to bring them safely to the United States.21 
President Johnson, reiterating the United States policy to 
take in refugees fleeing communism, announced a few days later 
that the United States would begin twice-daily flights to Havana 
to bring those fleeing refugees to the United States.22 The 
Johnson Administration estimated as many as 100,000 Cuban 
refugees arriving during the airlift.23 These flights became 
known as “freedom flights” and brought a mass surge of Cuban 
migrants to the United States.24 
American foreign policy at the time clearly favored support 
of Cuban migration from the Castro regime.25 What was less 
clear was how United States immigration policy, which at the 
time was based on the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 
would manage the large influx of Cuban arrivals. 
To manage the surge of Cuban migrants fleeing Castro’s 
Cuba in the mid-1960s, Congress enacted the Cuban Adjustment 
 
Estimates, to the Director of the CIA 6 (Feb. 21, 1961), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132656.pdf. 
 19. See Bockley, supra note 14, at 262. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., The “Other” Boatlift: Camarioca, Cuba, 1965, U.S. COAST 
GUARD, https://www.uscg.mil/history/uscghist/camarioca1965.asp (last 
updated Sept. 15 2015). 
 22. Robert Young, Begin Miami Flights for Refugees Dec. 1, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
7, 1965, at 1 (explaining that as many as 4,000 Cuban refugees monthly were 
expected during the airlift). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Joyce A. Hughes, Flight From Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 53 (1999). 
 25. Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 239. 
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Act of 1966 (“Cuban Adjustment Act”).26 This Act effectively 
turned Cuban migrants into a specially-protected class of 
migrants fleeing communism at the height of the Cold War. The 
Act put in place procedures allowing arriving Cubans as well as 
many Cubans already present in the United States to adjust to 
permanent resident status—the first step toward citizenship—
after only one year of presence, regardless of how the individual 
arrived in the United States. The Cuban Adjustment Act, which 
will be discussed in more detail later, paved the way to surging 
demand by Cubans to make their way to the United States. 
Cuban immigrants arriving in the United States prior to 
1980 were largely white, upper-class, educated elites who had 
property in Cuba that Castro either seized or devalued through 
his socialist policies.27 These Cuban migrants, who quickly 
became United States citizens in most cases, were active in 
politics and in pushing for United States actions against the 
Castro regime.28 These immigrants differed greatly from the 
subsequent migrants, which included large numbers of working 
class, apolitical or pro-Castro Cubans fleeing dire economic 
circumstances similar to those in nearby Haiti or the Dominican 
Republic.29 Yet, with the open door policy of the United States, 
they had a viable exit strategy. 
B. THE 1980S NEW WAVE POLICY: SAY HELLO TO THE 
MARIELITOS30 
President Carter gave a significant speech on political 
refugees in 1980 in which he stated, “[The United States] would 
continue to provide an open heart and open arms to refugees 
seeking freedom from Communist domination and from 
economic deprivation brought about primarily by Fidel Castro 
and his government.”31 This became known as the “open arms” 
 
 26. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966). 
 27. John Grogan, Early Cuban Refugees in Miami were Model of Success, 
FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Aug. 21, 1994), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1994-08-
21/features/9408190495_1_cuban-arrivals-cuban-immigrants-mariel. 
 28. See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 11 (noting that three Cuban-Americans 
were elected to Congress and took an active role in the policy of the United 
States towards Cuba). 
 29. See, e.g., Grogan, supra note 27. 
 30. A crude reference to the 1983 film Scarface, in which Al Pacino plays a 
criminal arriving in the United States from Cuba during the Mariel crisis. 
SCARFACE (Universal Studios 1983). 
 31. President Jimmy Carter, Remarks at a League of Nations Press 
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policy toward Cuban migrants.32 Castro responded by opening 
the Port of Mariel in Cuba, effectively permitting Cubans 
desiring to leave the island to do so freely.33 One-hundred 
twenty-five thousand Cubans took advantage of this opening 
and fled from the port to the United States where many were, as 
Carter intimated, welcomed with open arms.34 The exodus 
became known as the “freedom flotilla.”35 
Unlike in previous mass migrations, the majority of these 
Mariel migrants were working-class citizens, many of Afro-
Cuban descent.36 A smaller percentage were considered to be 
social outcasts, criminals, and those previously institutionalized 
for mental illness.37 The latter group was portrayed in the film, 
Scarface, where Al Pacino played a former Cuban mobster who 
came to the United States through the Mariel boatlift to build a 
criminal enterprise in Miami.38 
 
Conference (May 5, 1980). 
 32. See Hughes, supra note 24, at 56. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Michelle A. Satin, From Mariel into the Twenty-first Century: The 
Indefinite Detention of Cuban Excludable Aliens in the United States, 22 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 139, 139 (1996). 
 36. Hughes, supra note 24, at 56–57. 
 37. Silvia Pedraza, Cuba’s Refugees: Manifold Migrations, 5 CUBA 
TRANSITION 311, 318 (1995). 
 38. SCARFACE (Universal Studios 1983); see also Damarys Ocaña, Opinion, 
An Unfortunate Icon, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2008, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/dec/10/scarface-
al-pacino-anniversary-latinos (pointing to Scarface’s portrayal of Cuban 
immigrants who arrived on the Mariel boatlift as a negative reinforcement of 
stereotypes surrounding those immigrants). 
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Castro closed the port of Mariel following an agreement with 
the United States on October 31, 1980.39 Between the closing of 
the port and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cuban migration to the 
United States remained stable and relatively low. However, 
migration has recently trended to its highest levels since 
Castro’s revolution (see Figure 1 below).40 
Figure 1. Periods of Cuban Migration to the United 
States.   
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics. 
III. THE VEIL IS LIFTED 
The Soviet-led communist empire collapsed when the Berlin 
Wall fell in 1989. Countries that depended upon the Soviet 
Union, including Cuba, saw a dramatic reduction in their 
 
 39. See, e.g., Andrew Glass, Castro Launches Mariel Boatlift, April 20, 
1980, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2009, 4:19 AM), http://www.politico.com/story
/2009/04/castro-launches-mariel-boatlift-april-20-1980-021421 (“Washington 
and Havana agreed the impromptu exodus would end Oct. 31, 1980.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 242. 
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economic support.41 Similar to the Soviet Union, the veil was 
lifted from an artificially sustained economy.42 
Cuba’s economic conditions worsened quickly as the 
government attempted to survive without the Soviet 
apparatus.43 This economic crisis caused an increase in the 
number of Cubans seeking refuge in the United States (see 
Figure 1 above). One such effort of Cuban migrants fleeing the 
island made headlines when the Cuban Coast Guard sunk the 
migrants’ ferryboat, killing those onboard.44 This incident led to 
mass protests in Cuba against the Castro regime.45 In response, 
Castro announced that the Cuban government would no longer 
block migrants from leaving the island.46 
Following Castro’s announcement, 32,000 Cubans fled the 
island, principally on the grounds of economic (rather than 
political) need.47 Per the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans 
admitted into the United States would be eligible to apply for 
permanent resident status and, ultimately, citizenship. All they 
had to do was reach the United States and claim asylum.48 The 
United States government widely accepted Cuban migrants’ 
asylum claims in the face of communism and under President 
Carter’s open-arms policy.49 
The Cuban migrants in 1994, as noted above, were fleeing 
not necessarily communism but the economic consequences of a 
failed communist state. As exemplified in Figure 1, above, the 
number of Cuban migrants steadily rose beginning in 1990, 
following the end of the Cold War and the weakening of the 
 
 41. See, e.g., Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economic Effects on Cuba of the 
Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in CUBA AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 133, 147 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993) (“Soviet economic aid to 
Cuba assumed three forms between 1960 and 1991: credits to cover trade 
deficits, development loans, and price subsidies . . . . In 1992 all aid ended.”). 
 42. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 242–43. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 243. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Geoffrey W. Hymans, Outlawing the Use of Refugees as Tools of 
Foreign Policy, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 149, 153 (1996). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 
1161 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994)). 
 49. See Art Pine, Cuba Refugees in U.S. Hold Special Immigration Status: 
Citizenship: Those Fleeing Castro Are Unique in Being Guaranteed Entry. 
Haitians, Whose Exodus Is Similar, Say They Are Victims of Discrimination, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-08-19/news/mn-
28796_1_immigrant-status. 
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Cuban economy. Migrants fleeing dire economic circumstances 
during this period could place themselves in the same boat as 
other emigrants looking for a better life in America and, to an 
extent, decouple themselves from the status of a refugee fleeing 
communism. 
Recognizing this evolving political climate and also desiring 
to prevent another mass exodus, President Clinton sought to 
stop the raft migrants, or balseros, from risking their lives 
crossing ninety miles of dangerous sea. On August 19, 1994, just 
over two weeks after Castro’s announcement that he would not 
stop emigrants from leaving, President Clinton implemented a 
deterrence policy.50 The new policy required the United States 
Coast Guard to turn around Cuban boats on the open sea and to 
transport them to Guantanamo Bay or to other refugee camps 
for eventual repatriation to Cuba.51 
Yet, the migrants kept coming.52 It became clear to both the 
United States and Cuba that bilateral action was required to 
stop the balsero crisis.53 On September 9, 1994, roughly a month 
after the crisis was triggered, President Clinton and Fidel Castro 
entered into the Cuban Migration Agreement.54 This agreement 
required Castro to take measures to prevent Cubans from 
departing in unsafe vessels. In exchange, the United States 
promised to admit at least 20,000 Cubans legally each year.55 
Note that this policy is the only immigration policy that sets a 
floor rather than a ceiling on the admission of migrants from a 
single country.56 During a speech the following year, Clinton 
justified the policy: 
We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come 
here. We cannot let people risk their lives on open seas 
in unseaworthy rafts. . . . Regularizing Cuban migration 
also helps our efforts to promote a peaceful transition to 
democracy on the island. For too long, Castro has used 
the threat of uncontrolled migration to distract us from 
 
 50. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-95-211, CUBA: U.S. 
RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS 1 (1995). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 243–44. 
 53. See U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration, 5 U.S. DEP’T ST. 
DISPATCH 603, 603 (1994). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Joint Communique on Immigration Matters, Cuba-U.S., Dec. 14, 1984, 
35 U.S.T. 6479. 
 56. Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 61 (1999). 
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this fundamental objective. With the steps I have taken, 
we are now able to devote ourselves fully to our real, long-
term goal.57 
Further complicating the new policy on Cuban migration, 
President Clinton reversed the former United States policy 
allowing the 21,000 balseros to be detained at Guantanamo Bay 
pending repatriation to Cuba to be admitted as asylees.58 
Cuban migrants who took their chances on the sea hoping 
to land in the United States and be granted asylum according to 
the Clinton Accord were met with resistance. Between May 2, 
1995, and September 30, 1998, nearly 2,000 Cubans were 
interdicted at sea and returned to Cuba.59 Cubans were expected 
to follow traditional visa application procedures. However, those 
who successfully landed in the United States were considered 
“legally present” and could apply for asylum.60 
Cuban migration throughout the first decade of the 21st 
century remained steady at roughly 27,000 migrants per year.61 
President Obama addressed United States-Cuba relations as 
early as 2009, loosening restrictions on remittances and 
expanding opportunities to travel to Cuba for educational and 
scientific purposes.62 This was a significant break from the policy 
of his predecessor, George W. Bush, who maintained the 
economic embargo and focused on encouraging Cubans in Cuba 
to push for democratic change from the inside, without any 
significant outside change.63 
 
 57. President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Cuban-American 
Community (June 27, 1995). 
 58. See Clinton Administration Reverses Policy on Cubans, 72 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 622, 622 (1995). See also Ann Devroy & Daniel 
Williams, In Reversal, U.S. to Accept Cubans Held at Navy Base, WASH. POST 
(May 3, 1995), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/03/in-
reversal-us-to-accept-cubans-held-at-navy-base/d793a7a3-bf06-4dea-94c7-
f87499fee902/. 
 59. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40566, CUBAN 
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY AND TRENDS 9 (2009). 
 60. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) 
(1999). 
 61. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS 10 (2016). 
 62. Danielle Renwick, Brianna Lee & James McBride, U.S.-Cuba 
Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/cuba
/us-cuba-relations/p11113. 
 63. See, e.g., President Bush Outlines Cuban Policy Initiatives, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 24, 2007, 6:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb
/latin_america-july-dec07-cuba_10-24/ (quoting the President’s speech 
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More dramatic changes began later in the Obama 
administration. In 2014, President Obama announced the 
restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Cuba.64 In 2015, Cuba released fifty-three political prisoners 
as a sign of good will and progress toward improved human 
rights.65 Each country opened its embassy in Havana and 
Washington later that same year.66 And capping this series of 
executive actions, President Obama flew to Cuba—the first 
United States President to do so since Calvin Coolidge—to meet 
with Raúl Castro.67 
The changes taking place today in United States-Cuba 
policy are the most dramatic since the imposition of the 
congressional embargo in 1996.68 The eventual termination of 
the economic embargo will likely bring substantial 
improvements to the Cuban economy. At the same time, there is 
a significant possibility that softening relations between the 
countries will result in a removal of Cuba’s special immigration 
status.69 This has stirred fear among many Cubans who worry 
that the door to the United States is closing. This fear is reflected 
in the increase in Cuban migration since President Obama 
began softening relations (see figure 2 below). 
 
encouraging Cubans to initiate change). 
 64. Peter Baker, U.S. to Restore Full Relations with Cuba, Erasing a Last 
Trace of Cold War Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-relations.html. 
 65. Matt Spetalnick, David Adams & Lesley Wroughton, Cuba Has Freed 
All 53 Prisoners as Agreed in U.S. Deal: U.S. Officials, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2015, 
5:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-prisoners-idUSKBN0KL
10K20150112. 
 66. Katherine Vargas, Embassy Openings in Washington and Havana: On 
a Path Towards a Democratic, Prosperous Cuba, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21, 
2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/07/21/embassy-
openings-washington-and-havana-path-towards-democratic-prosperous-cuba. 
 67. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Randal C. Archibold, Obama Meets Raúl 
Castro, Making History, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/04/12/world/americas/obama-cuba-summit-of-the-
americas.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Frandal-c.-
archibold&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&modul
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Figure 2. Cuban Migration to the United States (2010–
2014).  
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics. 
According to recent data from United States Customs and 
Border Protection, the number of Cubans coming to the United 
States has sharply increased in 2015 and 2016.70 This reflects 
the rising concern among Cuban migrants that their window of 
opportunity is going to close. To better understand what the 
window has meant for the last fifty years, I will next examine 
the Cuban Adjustment Act in detail. 
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IV. THE SPECIAL CASE FOR CUBAN MIGRANTS 
A. THE CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 196671 
Prior to Castro seizing power in 1959, Cubans wishing to 
enter the United States had to follow the same visa procedures 
as immigrants from other countries.72 This meant applying for a 
visa at the American Embassy in Havana and meeting the 
criteria for a lawful immigrant. However, Castro’s new Cuba and 
the termination of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the 
United States led to a dramatic increase in the number of 
Cubans wishing to depart for the United States. 
A 1965 speech by President Johnson laid the context for 
what would become the Cuban Adjustment Act the following 
year: 
I declare this afternoon to the people of Cuba that those 
who seek refuge here in America will find it. The 
dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for 
the oppressed is going to be upheld. I have directed the 
Departments of State and Justice and Health, 
Education, and Welfare to immediately make all the 
necessary arrangements to permit those in Cuba who 
seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United 
States of America.73 
As thousands of Cubans arrived in the United States 
without a visa, they were “paroled” into the country on a 
temporary basis while they sought legal admission. This meant 
that they were allowed to enter the country but not provided 
with any legal status yet. Under the immigration law at the 
time, these paroled Cubans would have to leave the United 
States and apply for a visa at a United States embassy in most 
cases, to qualify for a legal admission.74 Doing so was very 
 
 71. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966). 
 72. Javier Talamo, The Cuban Adjustment Act: A Law Under Siege?, 8 ILSA 
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 73. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the 
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 74. Talamo, supra note 72, at 709; Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. 
L. No. 86-648, sec. 10, 74 Stat. 504, 505 (1960) (prior to 1966 amendment). 
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difficult.75 Accordingly, Congress passed legislation ensuring 
special protection for Cuban migrants to save them from having 
to apply for a visa. 
The Cuban Adjustment Act was introduced by Senator 
Edward Kennedy in 1966 and passed with overwhelmingly 
bipartisan support, including a 300-25 vote in favor in the House 
of Representatives and an unchallenged voice vote in the 
Senate.76 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the act into law 
in November 1966.77 The stated and largely supported purpose 
for the Act was to incentivize the end of communism in Cuba and 
protect those fleeing its grasp of communism.78 
The Cuban Adjustment Act amended the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1952 as follows: 
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act, the status of any 
alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been 
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States 
subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically 
present in the United States for at least two years, may 
be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion 
and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if 
the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and 
the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is 
admissible to the United States for permanent 
residence.79 
In essence, the Cuban Adjustment Act creates a special 
immigrant entry program just for Cubans whereby a Cuban 
emigrant can avoid the strict requirements of the INA.80 Unlike 
other immigrants, a Cuban does not have to enter the United 
States legally at a port of entry. Unlike other immigrants, a 
Cuban does not have to be lawfully present in the United States 
prior to applying for permanent residence. And, unlike other 
 
 75. Talamo, supra note 72, at 709–10. 
 76. David Abraham, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: Past and Future 
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 79. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966). 
 80. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (1994). 
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immigrants, a Cuban arriving anywhere in the United States 
may receive the protections of an asylee without showing a well-
founded fear of persecution.81 
The Cuban Adjustment Act allows any Cuban in the United 
States, regardless of how they entered, to adjust their status to 
legal permanent resident after two years of presence.82 Doing so 
is the first step toward applying for citizenship and requesting 
visas for family members. This is a unique and prized status for 
migrants that affords Cubans privileges no other migrants 
enjoy.83 
The Cuban Adjustment Act became a beacon that Cubans 
looking for a better life pursued, many to their peril. Likely the 
most famous case relating to the Cuban Adjustment Act is that 
of Elián Gonzalez, a six-year-old Cuban boy who was taken by 
his mother, against the wishes of his father, to the United 
States.84 The mother drowned en route to the United States but 
Elián arrived safely.85 Given his age, Attorney General Janet 
Reno placed Elián with relatives in Miami who sought to keep 
him in the United States by petitioning on his behalf for asylum 
under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The father in Cuba fought the 
petition, claimed that only he could petition for his son, and 
argued that Elián should be returned to him in Cuba.86 The 
federal district court judge and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed with the father’s argument that only a parent could 
petition for a child under the Cuban Adjustment Act.87 This led 
to the widely-publicized forcible taking of Elián from his 
relatives in Florida and his return to Cuba; an endeavor which 
involved 130 immigration agents, many armed. Years later, as 
an adult, Elián joined the Young Communist Party in Cuba and 
told Fox News Latino that “[the Cuban Adjustment Act led to 
the denial of] the right to be together with my father, the right 
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to keep my nationality and to remain in my cultural context.”88 
Following Fidel Castro’s death in 2016, Elián called Fidel a 
father figure to him.89 
The Gonzalez case highlights the controversial nature of the 
Cuban Adjustment Act. While its goal appears to have been to 
provide safe haven to Cuban migrants fleeing communism, it has 
effectively turned into an open door policy allowing Cubans to 
seek opportunity in the United States for any reason. It 
incentivizes Cubans desperate for a better life to take their 
chances at sea on their way to the United States. As political and 
economic relations evolve between the United States and Cuba, 
the Cuban Adjustment Act must also evolve to reflect the new 
reality of Cuban migration. 
B. THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION AGREEMENT 
Migration from Cuba escalated into the early 1990s, 
especially following dramatic speeches made by Fidel Castro 
about United States imperialism and the migration crisis, which 
he blamed on the United States’ policies toward migrants.90 By 
1994, the number of Cuban migrants had climbed to 40,000 (see 
Figure 1).91 This led the United States to negotiate with Cuba 
over the establishment of a “safe, legal, and orderly” migration 
process.92 
The accord reached by President Clinton and Fidel Castro 
applied a carrot and stick approach by which Cubans intercepted 
at sea would no longer be brought to the United States to take 
advantage of the Cuban Adjustment Act, but rather they would 
be taken to Guantanamo Bay, a United States-controlled naval 
base on the island of Cuba. Additionally, the United States 
 
 88. Elián González: My Time In The U.S. ‘Marked Me For My Whole Life’, 
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 90. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman & Linda Robinson, Castro in 1994: U.S. 
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offered a minimum of 20,000 visas to eligible Cuban migrants 
each year.93 
By May of 1995, 33,000 Cubans were detained at 
Guantanamo Bay with questionable legal status—they could not 
claim United States residency since they had never set foot on 
United States soil but they also refused to return to Cuba.94 
Ultimately, President Clinton decided to “parole” those Cubans 
into the United States in an effort to meet the 20,000 minimum 
quota set in the 1994 accord, which was a difficult target for the 
United States to reach with qualified migrants. As part of a new 
agreement between the heads of state in Cuba and the United 
States, the United States agreed to stop taking Cuban migrants 
to Guantanamo Bay and instead took Cubans interdicted at sea 
back to Cuba. The new policy, which returned Cubans captured 
at sea to Cuba and admitted Cubans who reach the United 
States’ shores under the Cuban Adjustment Act, became known 
as the “wet foot/dry foot” policy.95 
The open arms policy of President Carter had largely 
disappeared from the American public’s perception of Cuban 
migrants by the late 1990s. Following the balsero exodus, anti-
immigrant sentiment in the United States grew. Under 
Republican Governor Pete Wilson, California enacted 
Proposition 187 in 1994, also known as the “Save Our State 
Initiative.”96 The law barred undocumented immigrants from 
access to public services, including health and education. The 
law passed by large margins and was challenged three days later 
in federal court, where a federal judge struck it down as an 
unconstitutional usurpation of federal power. Judge Mariana 
Pfaelzer stated in her opinion that, “California is powerless to 
enact its own legislative scheme to regulate immigration. It is 
likewise powerless to enact its own legislative scheme to 
regulate alien access to public benefits.”97 
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Following on the actions of California, Florida, which faced 
the brunt of Cuban migration, initiated a lawsuit against the 
federal government seeking reimbursement in the amount of 
$1.5 billion for expenses associated with providing services for 
unlawful immigrants.98 Florida lost the initial suit and the 
appeal but claimed victory in drawing attention to the issue of 
immigration policy and the need for reform.99 Even though the 
suit was dismissed, Chiles, the Government of Florida, claimed 
that the “lawsuit was successful in that it raised awareness of 
the extraordinary impact of illegal immigration on border-states, 
like Florida.”100 
It is worth noting that in 1996 Congress enacted the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”) as an attempt at broad immigration reform under 
President Bill Clinton.101 IIRIRA established many new 
elements in the immigration law system, including employment 
verification to prevent the hiring of immigrants without the 
lawful right to work in the United States.102 As part of IIRIRA, 
Congress included a provision that would terminate the benefits 
of the Cuban Adjustment Act automatically once the President 
certified to Congress that Cuba had successfully transitioned to 
a democracy in accordance with the Helms-Burton Act.103 
However, as discussed elsewhere, the likelihood of the President 
invoking this provision is minimal as compared to the likelihood 
of repealing the embargo on Cuba.104 
Other attempts were made to repeal the Cuban Adjustment 
Act in the midst of the growing American distaste for migrants 
in the 1990s. But strong Cuban voices in politics helped to 
overcome any such attempts. Consider, for example, that in 
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February 1994, Democrat Michael Kopetski from Oregon 
introduced legislation to repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act, but 
the bill was not enacted.105 Later that same year, Cuban-
American and anti-Castro advocate Senator Robert Menendez 
from New Jersey argued that Congress should modify the Cuban 
Adjustment Act to prevent Cubans adjusting under the Act from 
returning to Cuba prior to being naturalized as United States 
citizens.106 As recently as March 2016, bipartisan legislation to 
repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act was introduced in the House 
of Representatives, though with little chance of passage.107 
V. WHAT ARE CUBAN MIGRANTS FLEEING? 
The Cuban Adjustment Act capitalized on the belief that 
emigrants from Cuba would come to the United States to fight 
the Castro regime, and communism generally, by draining the 
Cuban economy of its best and brightest, and by taking positions 
as Cuban-Americans against the regime. Prior to the Mariel Port 
Crisis in the 1980s, this was largely the case. Cubans that came 
to the United States tended to be white, educated, and often 
wealthy.108 Those Cuban migrants left Cuba to protest the 
Castro regime and to support anti-Castro movements in the 
United States. Some of these migrants eventually entered 
United States politics, pushing for more aggressive anti-Castro 
policies, including the 1996 Helms-Burton Act.109 
Beginning with the Mariel crisis, the typical Cuban coming 
to the United States had changed. They were less often white, 
educated or wealthy. They were, as scholar David Abraham 
noted, “much more like other immigrants from poor Latin 
countries”.110 Perhaps more importantly, these migrants were 
less politically active, less opposed to the Castro regime, and 
more interested in economic opportunity. This new migration 
context changed the Cuban-American community from an anti-
Castro and largely Republican base to a pro-reform and 
increasingly Democratic base. According to the Pew Research 
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Center, while 64% of Cuban-Americans identified as Republican 
in 2002, only 47% did so in 2013.111 
Cuban emigration shifted dramatically from political 
refugees to economic refugees in the 1990s.112 The Anti-Castro 
Cuban-American community has taken note of this shifting 
dynamic. In 2013, Florida Senator Marco Rubio told reporters 
that it is “very difficult to justify someone’s status as an exile 
and refugee when a year and a half after they get here they are 
flying back to that country over and over again.”113 High profile 
Cuban-American politicians began calling for the repeal of the 
Cuban Adjustment Act or at least modifications that prevented 
Cubans who did not oppose the regime from taking advantage of 
the law.114 
While it may seem to some that fleeing a difficult economic 
situation can be just as essential to a migrant as fleeing a 
difficult political situation, economic circumstances will not 
usually qualify a migrant for asylum or refugee status.115 Were 
it the case that the economic environment in a country would 
justify granting asylum to a migrant in the United States, we 
would likely see a significant increase in the number of asylum 
applicants from poor countries such as Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic, or even Mexico. However, the Cuban Adjustment Act 
has far less stringent requirements for granting arriving Cubans 
admission than any other country, meaning that a Cuban fleeing 
a poor economic environment could seek protection in the United 
States. 
According to the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans did not 
have to show a fear of persecution since it was assumed that they 
were fleeing a communist country for political reasons (even 
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though the same would not hold true for migrants fleeing China 
or Vietnam). “Congress in effect decided that because Cuba 
under Castro was Communist, in general no Cuban should be 
deported. The nationals of no other country have the same 
screening exemption.”116 
Perhaps no one is more outspoken against the continuation 
of the Cuban Adjustment Act than Fidel Castro himself. Castro 
called the Cuban Adjustment Act the “Killer Law” because it 
encouraged Cubans to partake in a dangerous journey across the 
sea to the United States with the expectation of a better life 
while breaking apart families and Cuban society. He said: 
The United States does not have any right to promote the 
death of people from this country, whether they are 
criminals or not. The diabolical killing machine that 
claims lives and provokes tragedies is nothing other than 
the Cuban Adjustment Act . . . .We will fight against this 
vicious law, this heinous and criminal law. We will keep 
fighting until it is repealed. Only then can we be certain 
that thousands of innocent children will not be illegally 
uprooted from their homeland, from their schools, from 
their identities, and subjected to extreme dangers or 
even death.117 
VI. ALIGNING CUBAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 
WITH REALITY 
The economic embargo the United States enacted against 
Cuba in 1962 has come under significant criticism recently and 
attitudes towards the embargo, in many ways, have softened.118 
The arguments underlying the push to end the embargo are 
quite similar to those underlying the push to end the Cuban 
Adjustment Act. As the United States moves closer to 
normalization of economic relations with Cuba, it must also end 
the special immigration status Cubans have enjoyed since 1966. 
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Communism posed an ideological threat to the liberal 
democratic ideals of the United States throughout the Cold War. 
Ideas about private property and resource management collided 
in these two systems and created a seemingly incompatible 
barrier to global relations. Citizens in a communist state could 
not become consumers of foreign exports or participants in the 
global economy, and therefore stymied the global economic goals 
of a capitalist world, led by the United States. One of the systems 
had to change for the world order to survive. 
When the dust settled from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, the economic catastrophe of the Soviet Union was revealed 
for the world to see.119 Weak oil prices, lack of trade, and 
disincentivized production were largely to blame for the failed 
economy.120 But the demise of the centerpiece of the communist 
architecture signaled a win for the liberal economic approach of 
the United States. Similarly, it motivated other countries with 
models similar to the Soviet model to implement reforms. 
Cuba shares its designation as a socialist state with three 
other nations today—China, Vietnam and Laos. The communist 
party has been in power in China since 1949, Cuba since 1966, 
Vietnam since 1976, and Laos since 1975.121 Each of these four 
socialist states began with austerity and strong state control and 
each has since bent to the will of free markets and economics. 
Vietnam was the first to open its door to free market 
policies. The end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 left a 
battered Vietnam with an economy in ruins. The Guardian 
newspaper lamented: 
The US left Vietnam in a state of physical ruin. Roads, 
rail lines, bridges and canals were devastated by 
bombing. Unexploded shells and landmines littered the 
countryside, often underwater in the paddy fields where 
peasants waded. Five million hectares of forest had been 
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stripped of life by high explosives and Agent Orange. The 
new government reckoned that two-thirds of the villages 
in the south had been destroyed. In Saigon, the American 
legacy included packs of orphans roaming the streets and 
a heroin epidemic. Nationally, the new government 
estimated it was dealing with 10 million refugees; 1 
million war widows; 880,000 orphans; 362,000 war 
invalids; and 3 million unemployed people.122 
Following the war, the United States enacted a trade 
embargo on Vietnam, much like the present embargo on Cuba, 
and influenced international agencies to limit their support of 
the socialist government there.123 By the late 1980s, Vietnam’s 
economy was barely breathing. The Vietnamese government 
moved quickly toward a market-oriented socialist policy that 
allowed private business, foreign investment, and free exchange. 
By 1994, the United States lifted the trade embargo and allowed 
money to flow back into Vietnam.124 In 2000, Vietnam began 
privatizing its state-owned enterprises and by 2006, it had 
acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO).125 The 
government remains socialist, but is largely free-market 
friendly. 
Laos similarly struggled to survive after the Vietnam War, 
which was significantly constrained within its neighbor’s 
borders but often spilled over into its territory.126 At the same 
time, it had been fighting its own civil war for independence 
against the constitutional monarchy in place since 1953. The 
King conceded power in 1975 to the Marxist government that led 
the fight against the monarchy.127 
From 1975–85, Laos functioned as a traditional socialist 
government, with centralized social and economic policies. 
However, lack of skilled laborers and challenging geographic 
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circumstances limited the economic growth of Laos.128 In 1986, 
the government, taking note of the success of Vietnam in doing 
so, began adopting market-oriented economic reforms.129 Like 
Vietnam, Laos privatized state-owned enterprises and opened 
their doors to foreign investment. Also similar to Vietnam, 
growth was strong following market-oriented reforms. Laos 
joined the WTO in 2013.130 
The elephant in the room is China—a major economic 
powerhouse that still embraces socialist values. Mao Zedong 
established the People’s Republic of China in 1949 with an 
emphasis on socialist principles and rural economic 
development.131 Differences of opinion between Mao’s approach 
and the approach of Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union led 
the two neighbors to part ways on communist ideologies during 
the Cold War.132 Following Mao’s death in 1976, communist 
party leader, Deng Xaoping, instituted Chinese economic 
reforms and argued that a socialist country and a market 
economy could coexist.133 
The Chinese model of market socialism was largely based 
on the idea that China would only be able to modernize if it 
traded with the West. China began implementing laws allowing 
foreign investment and foreign ownership as early as 1978, 
beginning a period of rapid economic development and 
growth.134 Today, China is growing rapidly and may soon 
surpass the United States in terms of economic size.135 But, the 
consumerist culture evident in the United States may not yet be 
 
 128. See Hatthachan Phimphanthavong, Economic Reform and Regional 
Development of Laos, 3 MOD. ECON. 179, 179 (2012). 
 129. See id.; see also Henry Kamm, Communism in Laos: Poverty and a 
Thriving Elite, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/30
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 130. Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/lao_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
7, 2016). 
 131. See The People’s Republic of China, supra note 121. 
 132. See W. Gary Vause, Perestroika and Market Socialism: The Effects of 
Communism’s Slow Thaw on East-West Economic Relations, 9 NW. J. INT’L. L. 
& BUS. 213, 222–23 (1988). 
 133. See id. at 223–24. 
 134. See id. at 224–26. 
 135. See, e.g., China Stumbles in Race to Pass U.S. as World’s Biggest 
Economy, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/china-stumbles-in-race-
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since the U.S. recovery from the recession). 
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fully reflected in the Chinese marketplace.136 Nevertheless, its 
transition from an economically-struggling to an economically-
thriving socialist state maintains the perception that a country 
need not abandon socialist principles to achieve economic 
growth. 
Some have argued that China’s transition from a strong 
communist country to a country centered on market-socialism 
may be appealing to Cuba as it considers its next move.137 China 
has not abandoned its socialist principles and yet has embraced 
free markets as vigorously as the United States. This model 
presents a viable mechanism for Cuba to stay true to its 
revolutionary roots and yet build a sustainable future for 
economic growth. 
The changes taking place in the Cuban economic and 
political structures, as well as those taking place in United 
States foreign policy toward Cuba, are entwined with 
immigration policy. Currently, Cuban immigrants in the United 
States are treated as political exiles fleeing communism and 
seeking protection from oppression.138 As Cuba transitions from 
a rigid socialist state to a market-oriented socialist state like 
China, the flight from communism argument dissipates rapidly. 
These economic changes in Cuba must eventually lead to the 
revocation of the Cuban Adjustment Act and the grouping of 
Cuban migrants with other migrants. Removal of the Cuban 
Adjustment Act and the lifting of the economic embargo are both 
highly likely in the near future. The question is whether the 
Cuban Adjustment Act will disappear before or after lifting the 
economic embargo. 
One of the conditions of the Helms-Burton Act to lift the 
economic embargo on Cuba is the establishment of a transitional 
government in Cuba.139 The policy statements underlying the 
Act clearly refer to the desire to remove Castro from the Cuban 
political system.140 Raúl Castro has already pledged to step down 
 
 136. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, China Not Yet Free Market, CATO INST., 
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 138. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 
(1966). 
 139. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 6021–91, Pub. L. No. 104-114. 
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from power in 2018.141 Upon relinquishing power, a younger and 
more market-friendly party member is expected to take control. 
The United States President may determine this to be a 
transitional move. 
The rationale underlying the application of the Cuban 
Adjustment Act to Cuban migrants, which was originally to 
protect Cubans fleeing Castro’s communist regime, would 
diminish dramatically with a market-oriented socialist 
government in place.142 In signing the Cuban Adjustment Act, 
President Johnson said: 
[I] declare this afternoon to the people of Cuba that those 
who seek refuge here in America will find it. The 
dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for 
the oppressed is going to be upheld. 
The lesson of our times is sharp and clear in this 
movement of people from one land to another. Once 
again, it stamps the mark of failure on a regime when 
many of its citizens voluntarily choose to leave the land 
of their birth for a more hopeful home in America. The 
future holds little hope for any government where the 
present holds no hope for the people.143 
There would be little room left to distinguish a migrant 
fleeing persecution in Cuba from one fleeing persecution in 
China. An immigrant fleeing persecution in China must 
demonstrate a well-founded fear in order to be considered for 
refugee or asylee status in the United States.144 An immigrant 
fleeing Cuba for any reason need only enter the United States 
and apply to adjust his or her status to a lawful permanent 
resident.145 Though the political conditions would be nearly 
identical, the process for entering migrants would differ 
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dramatically if the Cuban Adjustment Act were to remain in 
place. 
Of course, dismantling the Cuban Adjustment Act would 
mean closing the door to a pipeline of migrants from Cuba that 
has been open for half a century. Improving economic relations 
with Cuba have already begun signaling to the Cuban people 
that the open door policies of the past may soon be coming to an 
abrupt end, leading to substantial increases in the number of 
Cubans fleeing to the United States.146 This surge in Cuban 
migrants could be exacerbated further by shocks to the economy 
in the face of rapid economic reforms on the island. “[T]here is a 
significant risk of a mass exodus of Cubans to the United States 
if economic conditions take a turn for the worse [in Cuba]: this 
is a common occurrence in countries during the early phases of 
their free-market transitions.”147 Given the importance of Cuba 
in our history and in our immigration policy, it is critical that 
United States policy take a holistic approach to prepare for a 
new day in Cuba. I will address that recommendation in my 
conclusion. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The coming storm of Cuban migrants may be unlike 
anything seen before as Cubans face economic change, political 
transition, and the threat of being tossed into the much more 
rigid and limited immigration categories of their Latin American 
neighbors. Congress must act quickly to get ahead of this crisis 
by having a succession plan in place for a new United States-
Cuba relationship. This should include a phase-out of the Cuban 
Adjustment Act with predictable and transparent requirements, 
an economic development plan that emphasizes a rebuilding of 
the Cuban economic infrastructure, and a resumption of trade 
relations that encourage joint ventures and investment in 
Cuba’s growing private sector. 
The normalization of relations between the United States 
and Cuba has had positive effects on trade and investment, and 
this has led to both new opportunities and new hope for an 
improved Cuban economy.148 But, it has also stirred panic 
among some Cubans that normalization will mean an end to 
 
 146. See Hymans, supra note 46; see also Krogstad, supra note 70. 
 147. Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 236. 
 148. See Fandl, supra note 3, at 180. 
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their special immigration benefits.149 The fear has grown to 
significant levels, leading to a doubling in the number of rafters 
encountered by the United States Coast Guard between 
December 2013 and 2014 (see figure Figure 3, below).150 The 
Coast Guard released an announcement directed at would-be 
Cuban migrants reminding them that there have been no 
changes to immigration policy—yet.151 
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 150. Id. 
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Figure 3. Cubans Interdicted at Sea (1982–2015).  
Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 
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The United States embargo on Cuba today reflects a fixation 
with Fidel and Raúl Castro and with a period of our history that 
has largely disappeared from reality. Tying the lifting of the 
embargo to the departure of the Castro family and the 
replacement of a communist government with a democracy 
belies the point that Cuba poses no threat—either as a 
communist or a democratic state—to the United States or to the 
world. Nevertheless, the language of the Helms-Burton Act 
clearly ignores the possibility that a communist regime might 
become a market economy without abandoning socialist 
principles.152 
Immigration policy toward Cuba, like economic policy, must 
change. Cuba has already shown significant steps toward 
market reforms that will allow a quicker pace for economic 
growth on the island. Removal of the travel ban by the United 
States and resumption of flights in 2016 will begin to boost 
interest, investment, and ultimately, once regulations change a 
bit more, tourism on the island. All of these developments create 
an incentive to invest in Cuba for both Cubans and foreigners. 
As the market economy continues to develop, United States 
policy must focus on the Cuba of today—not the Cuba of the Cold 
War era. This means implementing sensible economic policies 
that facilitate sustained growth on the island after decades of 
isolation, as well as encouragement for Cuban-Americans to 
return to the island to facilitate its transition to a productive and 
strategic regional partner. Phasing out the Cuban Adjustment 
Act and removing the economic embargo are the first step in 
achieving this goal. 
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